What Can We Learn from Business Innovation Fail-ure of Uber in Southeast Asia Market? by Khozen, Ismail et al.
124




What Can We Learn from Business Innovation Failure
of Uber in Southeast Asian Market?
Ismail Khozen1,*, Illona Setianty2, Farah Dina Meiriza3
1,2,3 Universitas Indonesia, Mochtar Building - S2 FIA UI, RT.1/RW.1, Pegangsaan, Kec. Menteng, Kota Jakarta
Pusat, Daerah Khusus Ibukota Jakarta 10320
<ismail.khozen01@ui.ac.id>
1. Introduction
Organizations can develop inorganically and
organically. Organic development is driven by
innovation. Innovation influences success; this is
recognized by business leaders worldwide, as
shown by their survey results, which states that
change and innovation are important for the
sustainability and development of an organization
(Degraff & Quinn, 2007). The ability to innovate is
considered to be the most important ability for
business development.
The development of digital technology has
fundamentally changed the domains of diverse
platforms, such as Uber's market for mobility.
Uber is experiencing rapid growth, threatening
incumbents by introducing new business models
that create lower prices, new performance
parameters, and new levels of scalability (Laurell
& Sandstrom, 2016). Uber is a pioneer in the
emergence of the sharing economy and gig
economy phenomena labeled as a transaction
platform.
Sharing economy is defined as an economic
system based on sharing underutilized assets or
services, either for free or for a fee, directly from
individuals (Botsman & Rogers, 2015). In other
words, the sharing economy is a peer-to-peer
economic activity that provides a comfortable
lifestyle that all can reach through the
advancement of the Internet (Chua, Chiu, & Bool,
2019). Meanwhile, the gig economy is a working
system that prioritizes individual flexibility to
schedule their work and personal life (Gandini,
2018). Platforms related to digital innovation will
significantly influence or even transform markets,
industries, and society (Trabucchi, Buganza,
Muzellec, & Ronteau, 2021).
Uber started its business in 2009, and its
services were first launched in 2010 to solve
existing taxi ordering problems (Gomes et al.,
2019). Uber and its competitors are application-
based digital platforms that facilitate taxi-like
services by connecting consumers to the nearest
driver (Button, 2020). This ride-hailing platform is
becoming popular and common worldwide as a
sustainable option that complements public
transportation services (Liu & Kim, 2018). The
simplicity of ordering a vehicle is fueling the
increasing popularity of the application: with a
tap, a ride can be requested, GPS identifies the
place of origin and destination of passengers,
and fees are automatically charged to passenger
credit cards (Gomes et al., 2019). Uber has
operations in more than 600 cities worldwide,









Uber is a global pioneer in the sharing economy platform entitled ride-hailing. It
started to enter the Asian market in 2013-2014 with various community responses
in each region. In March 2018, Uber withdrew from the competition in Southeast
Asia after being acquired by one of the dominant players in the region, Grab. In
connection with Uber's failure to operate its business in the region, this paper
discusses Uber's business model, business expansion, competition in the market,
and the factors that led to Uber's failure in the Southeast Asian market. To
comprehensively describe the developing context for the purpose of this study, we
used a qualitative method with a systematic data collection approach from literature
reviews. This study emphasizes that large funding supports do not guarantee the
success of business operations in a more globalized setting. Different market
characteristics require different approaches. The case of Uber's failure in the
Southeast Asian market, even though it was supported by large funds to "Uberize
the entire world," proves that the characteristics made more "localized" are more
likely at a certain point in time to survive. This study also underlines some learning
points from the dominant factors causing the failure of Uber's business operations
in the region that require immediate consideration and adaptation: non-conformity
with market preferences, challenges from prevailing policies and infrastructure
issues, and strong competition from local competitors.
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their business models to meet local regulations
and demand patterns (Button, 2020).
Uber started to enter the Asian market in
2013-2014 (Bugador, 2019). The entrance of
Uber to the new market has been responded to
variously by people in each country. In Jakarta,
Indonesia, thousands of taxi drivers staged mas-
sive demonstrations in protest at the entry of the
transportation platform (BBC, 2016). Taxi drivers
perceive that they are the loser because Uber is
not governed by the same policies and does not
bear the same burden. The income of taxi drivers
has dropped dramatically since this ride-hailing
platform mushroomed in Indonesia (CNN-
Indonesia, 2017). On the other hand, not a few
Indonesians welcomed Uber's presence, wherein
many people switched from conventional taxis to
ride-hailing platforms such as Uber and Grab,
citing better service to consumers and competi-
tive prices (Liputan6.com, 2016). This can indi-
cate that Uber is an innovator who directly influ-
ences previously available technology, namely
the traditional taxi market (Willis & Tranos, 2021).
With the tough competition in the Asian
market, coupled with the rejection of the
conventional taxi industry, Uber has finally
stopped operating independently in Asia; in
China, Uber was acquired by Didi Chuxing in
2016 (Liu & Kim, 2018), where Didi Chuxing is
the dominant ride-sharing platform in China
(Wang, 2019). In Southeast Asia, Uber was
acquired by Grab, one of its competitors, in 2018
(Bostoen, 2020). The acquisition of Uber by its
competitors shows that Uber, despite its
successful innovations in various countries, failed
to operate its business in Asia. Several studies
have been conducted to analyze why Uber failed
to operate in Asia. This paper will discuss Uber's
business model, Uber's business expansion, the
competition in the market, and the factors that
caused Uber's failure in the Southeast Asian
market, and gather what we can learn from it.
2. Methods
Uber's failure in the Southeast Asian market,
which in 2018 was valued at the US $ 62 billion
compared to Grab as the acquirer (US $ 15)
(Desmond-Ng, 2018), leaves questions behind
the strategy and business innovation being
carried out. From this context, this study
conceptually analyzes the rationalization of
Uber's move to leave 8 countries in Southeast
Asia while $ 700 million has been spent there
(Reuters, 2018). This study uses a qualitative
approach based on a developing phenomenon.
Qualitative researchers examine how people
learn and understand themselves and their social
contexts and how they structure and give
meaning to their daily lives (Hox & Boeije, 2005).
We use a qualitative approach because the
problem in this study is centered on the context
that can describe and shape the understanding of
the things being researched and then developed
with several concepts used. Qualitative methods
allow researchers to collect data that is flexible
and sensitive to the social context (Hox & Boeije,
2005).
The research instrument that we use in data
collection is the literature study technique.
Literature study is a means of gathering
information related to a topic of interest that
involves identifying, taking notes, understanding,
making meanings, and sending information
(Onwuegbuzie & Frels, 2016). In this case,
researchers will analyze the content of books,
scientific papers, national and international
electronic media coverage, or other documents
related to the topic or theme of this study.
According to Onwuegbuzie and Frels (2016),
seven steps need to be taken to be able to
conduct a study using a comprehensive literature
review. They classify the seven steps into three
phases: the exploration phase, the interpretation
phase, and the communication phase. The first
five steps are the exploration phase, the six steps
into the interpretation phase, and the seven steps
is the communication phase. By adopting this
approach, we summarize our research process
as shown in Table 1.
Table. 1 Data Collection and Analysis Process
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Source: Authors' work adapted from Onwuegbuzie and
Frels (2016, p. 58)
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3. Result and Discussion
3.1. Business Model of Uber
A business model is a set of strategic deci-
sions that determine how a company produces a
sustainable and successful company (Cachon,
2020). In the Sharing Economy, technology has
paved the way to make things easier to reach
targets. Technology can bridge the gap and make
things more efficient and possible. Through Inter-
net development, sharing companies have
opened opportunities to access underutilized
assets and opened new avenues for others to
collaborate (Chua et al., 2019).
Uber is a digital platform-based business that
is not based on ownership of specific tangible
assets but emphasizes the ability to avoid
ownership and the responsibility of each asset
ownership. Digital platform-based business
models involve multi-sided markets, network
effects, and economies of scale that are much
more complex and different than traditional brick
and mortar-based businesses (Ramaiah, 2019).
Uber's business model as a two-sided platform
offers a wide variety of very different services
from traditional taxi companies in terms of price,
technology, and marketing (Schwalbe, 2018).
The value of this business model is based on the
demand-side economy that provides access, not
the supply side that owns assets (Davis, 2016).
In line with its business model, namely light-
asset, platform operators transfer physical logis-
tics responsibility to users and rely on (digital)
infrastructure from Cloud computing, Big Data,
and algorithmic control (Grabher & van Tuijl,
2020). This digital innovation in Uber's business
model has helped customers connect to the
nearest driver, with just a few clicks, via a mobile
app (Dell'Era, Trabucchi, & Magistretti, 2021).
Uber does not own a vehicle, provide training,
pay driver fees, provide insurance, or accept re-
sponsibility (Button, 2020).
Another Uber Value is to provide a value
proposition to drivers and passengers. A value
proposition is a factor that encourages
consumers to try or use a product or service
(Chua et al., 2019). The value proposition for
passengers is to position Uber as the right choice
for traveling: with one tap, they can book a ride
for 24 hours in 7 days (24/7) and track incoming
drivers. Besides, passengers have the flexibility
to choose the payment system for the services
they use, either in cash (in some countries) or by
using the so-called Uber wallet (Gomes et al.,
2019). For drivers, it is the freedom to choose the
working hours, an opportunity to earn money, and
the convenience of starting their own business.
The core of Uber's business model is a
dynamic pricing mechanism or also known as
price spikes, that are not only based on demand
but also a revenue model where the price
charged to passengers depends on the city of
travel destination, vehicle model, mileage,
demand, increase technique price (vehicle rates
vary on demand) and other elements (Button,
2020). Computer technology facilitates collusion
to fix prices, allocate markets or offers, even
reduce share by monitoring and enforcing
through intermediary algorithms. These invisible
computing mechanisms control and dominate the
way consumers interact in the digital world. It
secretly produces algorithmic (conscious
parallelism), a collusion agreement between
leaders in the core business that has been
successfully realized with the technology they
have developed (Ramaiah, 2019).
Uber's business process consists of five
steps: starting with a taxi request, then matching
the driver, followed by a customer journey, a
rating from the customer, and finally payment
(Gomes et al., 2019). Maintaining customer
relationships is certainly an important part of
Uber's business model. In the form of ratings or
comments via the Uber application, feedback
from customers can determine the quality of
service provided. The opinions of customers give
importance to a sustainable relationship to
continue using Uber services. Therefore, Uber
has a fast, reliable mobile system or application,
and 24/7 customer support is one way to
maintain and improve customer relationships
(Chua et al., 2019).
A new work paradigm has been created from
Uber's business model, where an online platform
manages workers, indirectly monitors them, and
expects to produce measurable output (Ursula,
2016). This new labor paradigm exemplifies new
market-based principles in which precarious em-
ployment relations and algorithmic control of the
labor process significantly affect shifting risk from
capital to labor. On the other hand, the new work
paradigm allows individuals to have freedom on
working hours rather than collective freedom,
thus enabling them to determine working hours
and wages according to their ability. In short, this
platform-based business entity concentrates on
high value-added activities while removing itself
from 'downstream' work obligations through the
practice of outsourcing and technology-based
subcontracting that remotely manages its frag-
mented supply chains (Edward, 2020).
However, Uber's platform-based business
model has created segmentation in the labor
market: mostly non-core outsourcing and
franchising activities and only small communities
as a small core of high value-added activities.
Core workers, namely founders and CEOs, enjoy
salary increases, pensions, and other benefits.
On the other hand, workers in outsourcing outlets
or peripheral have to settle for much lower and
often dangerous working conditions and salaries
(Edward, 2020). Platform operators try to
circumvent basic rights that result from
employment contracts such as social security,
minimum wages and working time and safety
regulations (Grabher & van Tuijl, 2020).
3.2. Uber Business Expansion
The experience of Travis Kalanick and Garrett
Camp, two young entrepreneurs who could not
find a vehicle on a snowy night in Paris, France,
became the beginning of the birth of the Uber
business idea. After the incident, they developed
a smartphone app that allowed people to get a
ride at the tap of a button. In March 2009, or just
three months since the app's development, Uber
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was launched in San Francisco (Barbour & Luiz,
2019). As the hometown of Uber, it is not surpris-
ing that San Francisco is the first city to legalize
ride-sourcing (Flores & Rayle, 2017). Resourcing
is a term for an application-based business model
that allows vehicle ordering (Button, 2020).
As a start-up company that is among the ear-
liest in this business, Uber has made a massive
business expansion. By adopting an aggressive
expansion policy, Uber's business has expanded
to six continents within seven years to be availa-
ble in 75 countries or more than 500 cities
(Barbour & Luiz, 2019). The introduction of this
business was not easy. In its home country, the
United States, the first ride-hailing service was
only available one year after launch. As shown in
Figure 1, one year after the initial operations on
the streets, Uber expanded to the hometown
where the first business idea emerged: Paris. The
following year, namely in 2012, Uber also began
to be launched in London, followed by the launch
in Sydney. For the Asian region, Uber's expan-
sion was first started in Singapore in early 2013.
Yeung (2013) stated that the reason for choosing
Singapore as the first destination is because the
country has long welcomed innovation and is the
center of technology in the region.
As shown in Figure 1, one year after the ini-
tial operations on the streets, Uber expanded to
the hometown where the first business idea
emerged, namely Paris. The following year,
namely in 2012, Uber also began to launch in
London, followed by the launch in Sydney. For
the Asian region, Uber's expansion was first
started from Singapore in early 2013. Yeung
(2013) stated that its reason to choose Singapore
as the first destination is that the country has long
welcomed innovation and is the center of tech-
Figure 1. Timeline History of Uber (2008-2018)
Source: Processed from https://www.uber.com; Barbour & Luiz (2019, p. 38); https://www.techinasia.com, and other
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nology in the region. An internal company survey
that found citizens in a country with only about
2,000 miles of roadway had grown tired of driving
on their own may be another reason.
After Singapore, the next destinations for Ub-
er's expansion are Taipei in Taiwan and Seoul in
South Korea. In the same year, Uber operated
discreetly in Manila, the capital of the Philippines.
Uber only officially operated in Manila in February
2014. In the same year, Uber also started operat-
ing in China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and Thailand.
In the 2015-2016 period, Uber tried to strengthen
its services in the Asian market with many inno-
vations to be more competitive with competitors
in the local market. An innovation made by Uber,
for example, is to allow cash payments in Vi-
etnam and Indonesia. In 2017, Uber launched its
services in Cambodia and Myanmar. However,
one year after that, Uber's services had to leave
Southeast Asia since they were acquired by
Grab, a local competitor in the region.
3.3. Overview of Competition with South-
east Asia' Local Players
Southeast Asia is a promising market. Ac-
cording to a study released by Google and Te-
masek (2019), the velocity of money in the online
transportation application sector in ASEAN in
2018 reached US $ 7.7 billion with 25 million ac-
tive customers. Online transportation application
services are now available in more than 500 cit-
ies in Southeast Asia, with 8 million orders per
day. The ride-hailing competition in Southeast
Asia to fight for a market of more than 640 million
people is quite intense between the three giants:
Grab, Uber, and Gojek. The market penetration
of the three companies in the Southeast Asian
market occurred in a relatively short period of
time. Table 2 summarizes the start of competition
in the intended market.
Table 2. Ride-Hailing Giants Market Penetration in South-
east Asia
Malaysia 2012 2012 2013
Thailand 2013 2019 (Get) 2014
Singapore 2013 2018 (Beta) 2013
Philippines 2013 Denied (lobby
still ongoing)
2014
Indonesia 2014 2011 2014
Vietnam 2014 2018 (Go-Viet) 2014
Myanmar 2017 - 2017
Cambodia 2017 - 2017
Source: Processed from https://www.uber.com;
Colgrave (2019, p. 7); https://www.techinasia.com;
https://techcrunch.com; https://kumparan.com; and
other
Apart from these three big players, the South-
east Asian market has no shortage of local play-
ers in each country. The new competitors from
this start-up in the transportation sector are: Thai-
land has a Go-Bike; Cambodia with PassApp and
EzzGo; Vietnam has FastGo, Vato, Taxigo, T.net,
Bee, and Xelo; Singapore has Ryde, Rilo Tech-
nologies, Tada, Jugnoo, Kardi, and Urge; in Ma-
laysia there are Mycar, JomRides, MULA, DIFF,
Riding Pink, and Dacsee; while the Philippines
has MiCab, ePickMeup, Angkas, GoLag, Owto,
Hype, and Hirna (Hanifan, 2019). However, these
companies only emerged after Grab or Uber had
expanded in their countries for many years. Be-
cause of this, entrants often find it difficult to
compete with the status quo. The survey con-
ducted by Huynh et al. (2020) in the case of Vi-
etnam shows eight factors that influence the cus-
tomer's intention to choose an application, name-
ly gender, age, cost of living, mileage, the utility
of service providers, the popularity of service
providers, influence of family and community
opinion, and attractiveness of other means of
transportation.
Uber has instilled a competitive and institu-
tional upheaval process in the transportation sec-
tor by introducing a platform logic (Geissinger,
Laurell, & Sandström, 2020). In a sharing econ-
omy ecosystem such as online transportation, the
elements involved influence one another. In the
'sharing' transportation business, business opera-
tions are aimed at sharing vehicles and sharing
users and vehicle owners themselves (Schwalbe,
2018). If we look at the reality, many drivers use
Uber and other applications simultaneously,
which results in a tariff war that is not entirely
effective for business continuity. As a giant com-
pany that has operations in more than 600 cities
in the world and seems to be increasingly adopt-
ed in various parts of the world, Uber often faces
difficulties when there is a tariff war.
In addition, local government regulations also
put pressure on expanding online transportation
companies such as Uber. For example, in Indo-
nesia, with the regulation of minimum and maxi-
mum tariffs for online transportation providers,
this is a direct attack on Uber's core transporta-
tion business, which implements a dynamic pric-
ing business model. In addition, the policy of limit-
ing the number of vehicles, testing vehicle licens-
es, and the obligation to form a corporation has
been an obstacle to online transportation busi-
nesses such as Uber so far. Meanwhile, in cer-
tain cases, such as in the Philippines, local start-
ups are spoiled by local regulations so that for-
eign companies such as Uber or Grab can no
longer operate there for illegal reasons —a status
that does not really apply to local players. The
role of regulators in the Philippines for local play-
ers seems to be acting as stakeholders who
"have to provide assistance in order to maximize
the opportunities that exist and minimize obsta-
cles faced" (Eravia, Handayani, & Julina, 2015,
p. 96). In the case of Uber, if the competition with
local players was no longer possible, it ended the
competition by selling its operations to local com-
petitors, acquiring those competitors, or partner-
ing with them (Bostoen, 2020).
After operating for about five years, on March
26, 2018, Uber agreed to sell its operations in
Southeast Asia to its local competitor, Grab
(Bostoen, 2020). Uber has actually invested
about $ 700 million to compete in Southeast Asia
(Reuters, 2018). However, according to Thomson
(2019), Uber's one size fits all approach cannot
adapt fast enough to meet the diverse needs of
different cities and countries. Grab achieved its
dominant position by successfully pushing Uber
out of Southeast Asia. The strategy used by Grab
is simple and based on providing services that
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are tailored to the commercial and cultural needs
of local residents. Grab's "localization" strategy
was significantly more successful. For example, it
took Uber two years to start accepting cash pay-
ments in countries where cash dominates be-
cause only a small proportion of the population
has access to a credit card. Whereas a global-
ized business should be able to make payment
transactions using more common means of ex-
change (Saptono & Khozen, 2021). On the other
hand, Grab recognized these characteristics first
so that it started accepting cash payments from
the beginning (Thomson, 2019). Recognizing
local characteristics seems simple, but it allows
businesses to have a competitive advantage over
competitors (Widiastuti & Santoso, 2020).
3.4. Factors Affecting Uber's Failure in
the Southeast Asian Market
Uber is often seen as a phenomenon or a
form of sharing economy. Uber and its sharing
economy place itself in many people's lives and
in the economies of many countries (Schneider,
2017). With its tagline "Uberize the entire world,"
Uber was motivated to expand internationally to
enlarge its business scale (Bugador, 2019). With
their success in the United States, Uber then
expanded its operations to various cities in Eu-
rope, such as Paris, Berlin, and London, then
also to Sydney (Australia), Mexico (Latin Ameri-
ca), and Johannesburg (South Africa). Uber in-
troduces technology that everyone can have ac-
cess to use Uber services, as long as that person
has a smartphone and the internet, regardless of
location; a very innovative technology (Bugador,
2019). Uber, which was initially considered a lux-
ury service with premium black cars, has become
relevant to many people because it opened up
opportunities for people to become drivers. Uber
discloses transactions that may occur in the mar-
ket, a transaction that has never happened be-
fore; they reveal to customers and service pro-
viders the potential existence of unexploited mar-
kets (Trabucchi et al., 2021).
In 2013-2014, as we discussed in the previ-
ous section, Uber finally started to enter the
Asian market. The ride-hailing business model is
suitable in emerging market regions, such as
Asia, because it is more efficient than traditional
taxis. In some areas, ride-hailing applications
help navigate the local transportation system that
is not good enough, adjusting to local travel
needs (Bugador, 2019). Despite all the technolo-
gies and innovations introduced and successfully
implemented in various parts of the world, Uber's
operations did not last long in Asia. Uber China
was finally acquired by Didi Chuxing in 2016, only
two years after Uber expanded its business to the
country (Liu & Kim, 2018), while Uber Southeast
Asia was acquired by Grab in 2018 (Bostoen,
2020) —both of which are Uber's biggest compet-
itors in each region. Several studies have been
conducted to analyze why Uber failed to operate
in Asia, with some of the factors causing its fail-
ure as follows.
3.4.1. Non-conformance with market preferences
The payment method on the Uber application
can only use a credit card. Uber fails to under-
stand that most Southeast Asia people still use
cash in their daily lives (Desmond-Ng, 2018).
Several countries in Asia prefer cash due to the
weak credit card system in their country. As a
result, not all levels of society can use Uber. Uber
did not consider this payment issue to be an im-
portant issue when they entered the Asian mar-
ket. On the other hand, local competitors who
know exactly what their people's preferences
then introduced a ride-hailing application that is
more reliable than Uber (Bugador, 2019). For
example, one of the features that Uber's local
competitors in the region are introducing is cash
payments
3.4.2. Challenges from existing policies as well as
infrastructure problems
One of the main problems that Uber faces
when entering the Asian market is adjusting to
policy. Countries in Asia have different political
systems and transportation policies in each coun-
try. When entering the Asian market, Uber faced
several kinds of charges due to regulatory viola-
tions, such as monopolistic behavior and unfair
competition, unregistered drivers, security
measures, and safety. In the end, Uber paid huge
fines for these demands (Bugador, 2019). When
entering the Asian market, Uber does not actively
seek and cooperate with policymakers, so its
policy framework is hostile (Desmond-Ng, 2018).
Concerning the infrastructure, Uber is having
problems with its Global Positioning System
(GPS) and Google Map application. In some
countries in Asia, Uber drivers can manipulate
the GPS to increase the discount, so Uber has to
pay a bigger incentive. Using Google Maps is
also difficult because some countries (like China)
have strict rules considering security reasons.
Thus, Uber drivers and customers have to alter-
nate using map applications so that the Uber map
system becomes irrelevant (Bugador, 2019).
3.4.3. The face of competition
The ride-sourcing industry is nearing perfect
competition, with no brand loyalty from its users.
Uber was ultimately unbeatable against the local
players in terms of price. Local brands, such as
Grab in Southeast Asia, have benefited from in-
troducing some of the more familiar features to
local people, such as payment using cash, order-
ing via text message, and even applications that
use local languages (Bugador, 2019). In China,
Didi Chuxing provides a lower price than Uber,
adjusting to the characteristics of a price-
sensitive society. Didi works closely with local taxi
companies in several cities, a different strategy
from Uber (Liu & Kim, 2018).
Besides, Grab first introduced ride-hailing us-
ing motorbikes, an innovation for people in cities
with bad traffic conditions (Desmond-Ng, 2018).
Local players have the advantage because they
always localize their ride-hailing application, ad-
justing to the conditions in the country where they
operate, something that Uber has done too late.
When local players try hard to localize, Uber did
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not focus on their operations in each country be-
cause of many problems they face worldwide
(Bugador, 2019). In addition, Uber is also faced
with rejection from conventional taxi companies in
Asia (Desmond-Ng, 2018), partly resulting in
massive demonstrations by conventional taxi
drivers (BBC, 2016). Uber, by offering a taxi-like
service but cheaper than traditional taxi compa-
nies can provide, has caused attention and criti-
cism not only in Southeast Asia but from the taxi
industry around the world (Vieira, Paiva,
Alcântara, & Rezende, 2020).
4. Conclusion
Uber has become one of the causes of the
emergence of the sharing economy and gig
economy phenomenon, labeled as a transaction
platform. Uber is a digital platform-based
business that does not rely on ownership of
specific tangible assets but emphasizes the
ability to avoid ownership and the responsibility of
the ownership. Uber's business model is
characterized as a light-asset by innovating the
opportunities that digital technology provides.
Digital innovations developed on Uber's business
model have helped customers connect directly to
the nearest driver via the mobile app. With this
technological innovation, Uber is expanding
globally to enlarge its business scale, including
Southeast Asia, according to its tag line "Uberize
the entire world." However, in Southeast Asia,
Uber's operational activities did not last long,
which only lasted from 2013-2018. The
acquisition of Uber by its competitors shows that
Uber, despite its successful innovations in
various countries, failed to operate its business in
the region. With its "localize" approach, Grab is
even more successful in acquiring markets in the
region. Some of the dominant factors that led to
the failure of Uber's business operations in the
Southeast Asia region were inconsistencies with
market preferences, challenges from prevailing
policies and Uber's infrastructure problems, and
strong competition from local competitors. Hence,
this study summarizes that different market
characteristics require different approaches. The
case of Uber's failure in the Southeast Asian
market shows us that characteristics that are
made more "localize" are more likely to persist in
certain regions.
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